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Politics of Metaphor: Providing Political Power by Re-Literalizing Metaphors in the Public Speech

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In this paper, I accept the general assumption of current metaphor theories as put forth by different philosophies of language and knowledge that metaphors are an irreplaceable means of transporting new aspects of meaning and knowledge about things and are therefore an important factor of re-shaping reality. The purpose of this paper is to discuss this issue of metaphor by considering characteristic samples of the current political discourse in the Austrian election campaign of 1995. My thesis is that, if metaphor must not be trivial (i.e. replaceable by a literal meaning), its specific significance has to be examined by identifying discursive strategies and effects of metaphor. Thus, to re-literalize metaphors does not mean to reduce them to literal meanings; it is to build, via metaphors, a socially or politically comprehensible net of messages while addressing people and mobilizing them for certain political goals or even, I suggest, for profound ideological reshaping of the society without being forced to respect the rational demands of the political discourse. On this background, the paper serves as a case-study attempting to re-approach the theoretical discussions on metaphors in semantics, semiotics and pragmatics of language.

I wish to thank professor Elemer Hankiss for his sincere interest and comments. I will answer his criticisms where necessary.

I. Introductory Remark: Trivializing Metaphor through Overevaluation

It is widely believed in contemporary philosophy that metaphors -- standing for both the whole class of rhetorical figures or tropes called "metaphors" (synecdoche, metonymy, metaphor etc.) and one particular case of metaphoric speech (which seems to be the most difficult to identify) -- are not only a natural but indispensable part of our every day language and also of our learning process about the world. Metaphors are considered as a necessary means of our cognition and consequently, a large part of contemporary language and knowledge theories are concerned with exploring metaphors.

There are three main groups of theories about metaphor due to three different levels of situating metaphoric transfer:

1) Semiotic or structuralist theories, based upon Saussure's theory of the linguistic sign, which explains the metaphoric transfer in terms of the difference between signifier and signified which causes a "sliding" either of signifier to another signifier or of signified to signified; basically elaborated by R. Jakobson in his general theory of two poles of language and adopted by structuralist psychoanalysis.

2) Conceptualist theory of metaphor arguing about metaphors independently of the semiotic level (signs, be they signifiers or signifieds). Metaphors are not

produced by signs. Instead, it is the metaphoric structure of the conceptual system of humans which produces metaphoric structure of speech.

3) Linguistic theories of metaphor stemming generally from the theory of "semantic fields of language" or "word fields" (a basically Saussurian model). It says that every unit of our language is defined by and used through the appeal to a set of differential relations to other units and that metaphors are characterized by anaphoric model of reference.

Beyond these, one has to mention a further group embracing different philosophical theories of metaphor (and against metaphor) which are based upon general theories of sign and of meaning which go across the three levels mentioned above such as semiotic philosophy phenomenology and hermeneutics, ordinary language philosophy, analytical philosophy of language, history of science and theories about the structure of knowledge in general.

However, the rehabilitation of metaphor in the discourse about language and knowledge entails a great deal of overevaluation in the sense that a particular semiotic issue of language has become its general feature and hence less explicative. If everything is based on metaphors, then one can say that metaphor is trivial. A further consequence which is clearly visible within the deconstructivist current of semiotics, is that metaphoric discourse yields an unlimited production of metaphors. Words are being interpreted as if every one was a metaphor, and every word-metaphor was a picture to re-metaphorize. As a result, the most important task of descriptive theories of metaphor has become, not only to thematize and apply metaphors, but also to limit their field, to reestablish the difference between metaphoric and literal discourse, and to trace the difference between meaning and use etc. This means, more precisely, that the task of metaphor theories has been to shape and define the non-trivial aspect of metaphoric language, to identify the impact of metaphor to our knowledge, and, as a consequence, to test the necessity of using metaphors. This is the most difficult aspect of the metaphor issue in the current theories because in order to limit the field of metaphors one needs a metatheory of metaphoric language which again presupposes that metaphors be universalized or, at least, generalized. This means, in order to analyze metaphors as non-trivial features of speech, one has to show that they are irreplaceable means of expression.¹

If it is true that metaphors are indispensable means of our comprehension system, i.e. of our conceptual apparatus and communication means, then this must also be true, not only of literary and scientific discourse, but also of all those fields in which every day language is included. In order to examine this assumption and to prove whether metaphors have that importance, I would like to recall some samples of metaphoric speech in political discourse. In doing so, I have to introduce some linguistic, epistemologic and semiotic aspects of the metaphor issue and also, insofar as metaphors are parts of more complex discursive items, some further explanations stemming from the speech act theory. However, I cannot focus exhaustively upon all relevant aspects of the metaphor issue such as esthetics, rhetoric and the style feature of the speech items to consider. While considering only a few of these aspects, the main

question will instead be a pragmatic one as to whether there is a specific political meaning provided by metaphors -- and this means: by the very "rhetoricity" of language -- and, hence, whether there can be any politics by metaphors. In order to address this problem I will consider some samples of metaphoric speech which have a certain discursive value in the Winter 1995 Austrian election campaign which were widely cited, commented, and related to in the public discourse.

11. Metaphors in Political Discourse (The Austrian Election Campaign 1995)

There is, as a matter of fact, one metaphor which calls for attention: the metaphoric use of the German verb *ausmisten* by the President of the Austrian conservative party FPÖ, Jörg Haider. At the first election meeting in Klagenfurt, he said:

"Wenn Haider kommt, dann wird Ordnung gemacht, dann herrscht Gerechtigkeit in diesem Lande, dann wird **ausgemistet** in allen Bereichen, wo (...)!"²

The metaphoric expression "(es) wird *ausgemistet*" (henceforth referred to as *ms1*) has proven to be fertile. It has often been cited, answered and extended ("Wir misten selbst aus!", "In Österreich wird nur noch mit zugehaltener Nase gewählt", "Das ist ein Sumpf"). But the question may be raised as to whether this is just a funny language game or if there is a *specific* significance to be ascribed to this expressions so that the initial metaphor *ms1* cannot easily be replaced by any literal equivalent without a loss of significance or sense. According to the general thesis about metaphors, a specific significance must have been provided (transported) by the metaphor. This is supported by the fact that *ms1* had become so fertile in such a relatively short period of time. However, in order to identify and establish this specific meaning, one has first to ensure that the metaphor *ms1* is a necessary and/or irreplaceable one and, second, to discuss in which way it is constitutive for the meaning of the expression developed.

Given that *ms1* has caused much excitement in the Austrian public sphere, that it is found in numerous different forms of use (citation, reformulation, answering) even though at first sight there is nothing very special or scandalous about it (it is neither a sample of vulgar speech nor is the speaker of the sentence considered as a timid person -- one is used to hearing such expressions from him), it is obvious that the *ms1* has been widely understood and that it can easily be replaced by other more or less literal equivalents. Thus we have enough to consider it as a *trivial* metaphor. Nonetheless, the reception of this expression suggests the opposite: one may assume that it bears a certain special political meaning which could not easily be replaced by another expression. In terms of speech-act theory, it has been provided by a certain illocutionary force which has to be analyzed only in close relation to the expression which has been used.

In terms of linguistic analysis, one may explain *ms1* in the following way. The expression "*ausmisten*" literally means "move the dung away (from the stall)" and it is an item of farmer's every day vocabulary. But as used in the

every day language of the public sphere which is not predominantly (or not at all) a world of farmers or peasants in which the stall is not the normal item of the world to associate, the expression appears somewhat harsh. Nevertheless, its use seems motivated and "normalized" by other possibilities provided by the average language style. The German noun "Mist" in Austria, is not only a part of peasant vocabulary, it is also used for "rubbish". Thus, it is the carrier of other metaphoric expressions like "Mist bauen" (or, the opposite: "Mist abbauen") to indicate wrong actions and wrong things done (respectively, to remove or "repair" them). Accordingly, it would be possible to substitute the expression "Mist abbauen" to the expression mSI. But "ausmisten" and "Mist abbauen" clearly do not have the same value and do not designate the same "thing". Every competent speaker of German (and Austrian) feels that "ausmisten" aims at "much more" than "Mist abbauen". Interestingly enough, the speaker of mSI very often utilizes the expression "Mist bauen", but, at the situation indicated, he certainly did not use the expression "Mist abbauen" (or anything similar) instead of "ausmisten". It is not certain whether he has ever used or would ever use it to replace mSI.

Regardless of this issue, there is an additional linguistic difficulty: Although it is likely that a German speaker would utilize the expression mSI in order to say "etwas in Ordnung bringen" (usually a space-like item in the world, such as a house, but also abstract items like interpersonal relations, feelings, thoughts etc.; they are being imagined as "within" a space, soul, head) the verb "ausmisten" does not lose the character of being too drastic and somewhat inappropriate for "normal" use. For if such a harsh sense (like: "radical disorder") is not intended, the speaker would rather say "Mist abbauen" than "ausmisten" as a contrast to "Mist bauen" or, more convenient, "aufräumen". On the other side, it is not possible to replace the expression "ausmisten" with the expression "Mist bauen/abbauen" in the natural environment. One cannot say in German "Kühe bauen Mist (ab)" without provoking laughter; if one was to say this, he would be considered as a funny person or as an incompetent speaker (foreigner). Accordingly, a literal expression containing the noun "Mist", if used with regard to the house rubbish, and not to the stall dung, has to be in Austrian German "Mist austragen". (In German German it is rather "Müll austragen".) Nevertheless, in both national versions of the every day language use, metaphoric use of "ausmisten" for "rebuilding order" or "radical cleaning" are possible. Thus "ausmisten" remains, in its literal meaning, related only to the language of farmers.

Therefore, the linguistic (or better lexical) explanation indicates that the expression "ausmisten" seems to have a restricted semantic field, i. e. that, in its literal meaning, it cannot be replaced with many other expressions. As a matter of fact, it is replaceable only by a description (paraphrase) of what really is being done when used in German "ausgemistet wird": namely, "es wird Mist ausgetragen (aus dem Stall)" or "der Stall wird gereinigt vom Mist." But this also proves that mSI is not comparable, and even less reducible, to any other normal expression indicating the action of bringing things in order or reestablishing order by putting wrong things away or to its proper place. Instead, one is forced

to keep in mind that the expression stays for a very specific action which can hardly be said of other singular actions of the type (cleaning the house, arranging a room etc.) because it has a highly derogatory value. "Ausmisten" means "cleaning the stall", moving dung away, and not reestablishing any kind of order. For dung belongs to the natural order of the stall. It is an indispensable element and, insofar as it is natural, it is symbolically irreplaceable. More precisely, "ausmisten" is a strongly stall-bound action and context-bound way of speaking and it becomes necessary that, whenever one uses the verb outside the strongly presupposed context of stall, one can use it only as a metaphor.

It is likely that the lexical status of the expression mS1 signalizes that we are not confronted with an intentionally built metaphor on the basis of a harsh sense for humor, but rather with a literally intended expression. The speaker of the sentence, while using the expression cited, speaks as if he assumed that he be in the natural environment of "ausmisten". Therefore, the metaphorical character of the expression seems to be provided only by the fact that it was uttered in an other context than the natural one (political meeting instead of a stall). However, a political meeting is not a stall, the public sphere is not a farm, and consequently the expression mS1 cannot be taken for a literal one. Therefore, a condition must be provided for a metaphoric expression to function as a literal expression, albeit remaining metaphoric. The condition is that it gets embedded in another metaphorical framework which, in the linguistic practice, need not be visible. This means: in order to analyze a metaphoric expression like mS1, we have to take it as an expression which is backed up by a larger metaphorical framework. This is indicated through the lexical instruction about "ausmisten" which necessarily implies that there must be a stall. For "ausmisten" in German has exclusively the meaning of "removing dung from the stall", and not from any other house-like or room-like space. It is therefore required by language use that one cannot, neither in German- nor in Austrian-German, say "ausmisten" without implying that the house-like space intended is or has become a stall. Thus the background metaphor we have been searching for in order to explain the literality of the metaphor mS1 is the assumption that something "is" a stall. This background assumption is the invisible organizer of the metaphoric order of speech through visible items of sentences.³

Nevertheless, one may object that the expression mS1, in order to be understood, needs no further explanation. Indeed, literality and comprehensibility of speech items do not depend on each other. For it is obvious that the metaphoric expression mS1 is very much understandable to native speakers or to every competent speaker of German. More over, the context of the expression mS1, which is given by the whole sentence (SI), seems to provide the full comprehensibility by itself. But it is not the purpose of this analysis to explain what the metaphoric expression mS1 means. The aim is rather to find out whether there is a particular significance of it which is due only to the metaphoric status of the expression. In order to test it, we have to intervene in the syntactical structure of (SI). It is built upon three parallel (or paratactically related) if-then clauses which seem to explain each other:

(SI): "Wenn Haider kommt, **dann** wird Ordnung gemacht, **dann** herrscht Gerechtigkeit in diesem Lande, **dann** wird ausgemistet (...)"

Namely, it is obvious that the syntactic structure of (SI) allows for omitting the last expression (the metaphoric one, mSI: "(es) wird ausgemistet") without risking the destruction of its general structure or seriously damaging the content. The sentence would then be the following:

"Wenn Haider kommt, dann **wird Ordnung gemacht**, dann herrscht Gerechtigkeit in diesem Lande (...)"

This small intervention in the clause seems to better suggest what the speaker intended to say rather than by the metaphoric expression mSI. The rest of SI, maintaining the structural (syntactical) identity of the sentence through two paratactically arranged clauses "dann wird Ordnung gemacht" and "dann herrscht Gerechtigkeit", indicates that these items of the sentence have either identical or very close meaning to the clause omitted. What this allows for is to say that "wird ausgemistet" means the same or indicates the same meaning as "Ordnung wird gemacht". Thus the latter expression seems to be either a translation or an equivalent substitution for the expression mSI. If so, one could say that the speaker of the sentence, by the very same speech act, translates, substitutes or comments on one part of his own speech by another. In this sense he performs a kind of metalinguistic activity which is, according to language theories, a normal part of our linguistic behavior beginning in early childhood. Consequently, one can say that the speaker himself explains the meaning of his metaphor, that he interprets himself by appealing to a more understandable and more convenient expression than mSI and the whole story about the metaphor can be finished.⁴ Hence, for further explanations, I am going to designate the expressions "(es) wird Ordnung gemacht" and "(es) herrscht Gerechtigkeit" as literal Sentence 1 (litSI), *presumed* to designate or to indicate the literal meaning of mSI.

Another important formal argument seems to ensure that two expressions relate to each other as metaphor and its literal translation. It is provided if one considers the *anaphoric* structure of reference between three expressions, a structure in which one item of speech is considered as leading to or indicating another which is either equally, less, or not at all metaphoric. Thus, one can say that the order of appearance of syntactical units in SI is built upon a chain of "leading", first, by threefold repetition of the conjunction "dann", second, by gradation of strength in content from the more abstract to the less abstract and finally to the concrete (Ordnung machen, Gerechtigkeit herrschen (lassen), ausmisten), and, third, by the common reference to the adverbial expression "in diesem Lande" which is positioned in the middle of the sentence SI, or more precisely, in the second if-then clause: "dann herrscht Gerechtigkeit in diesem Lande" so that the first and the third if-then clause can relate to it without repetition.

However, the syntactical analysis of (SI) makes sense only because we have

already accepted the idea that one expression is more metaphoric than the other. But the fact that litS1 is less metaphoric, or not meant as metaphoric by native speakers does not provide a sufficient reason for considering it as real, objective or literal meaning of mS1. The difference between the two expressions is not the difference between a metaphoric and a literal expression but rather between a more metaphoric more concrete and specific one, and a less metaphoric more abstract and more convenient one. Hence, the literal expressions "(es) wird Ordnung gemacht" and "(es) herrscht Gerechtigkeit" can be considered as unconscious" or weak metaphoric expressions (henceforth both referred to as mS2).

As a result, the whole sentence (SI) cannot be understood merely as a sample of self-interpreting or self-translating speech -- speech in which a metaphor is being resolved in the way the speaker gives it a proper literal meaning. Rather it is, as I suggested above, a sample of speech which itself provides conditions of being literal - albeit in metaphoric terms. The main condition for this is that there be a tacit, non-expressed assumption such as that the "space" intended -- and expressed in the words "in diesem Lande" -- has become a stall. It is, as I have suggested above, a necessary implication of the verb "ausmisten". If seen against this background, the whole sentence SI, whose hypotactical structure (wenn-dann) is based upon an underlying paratactical order of if-then clauses (dann-dann-dann), can be completed and explained by two additional items: The expression mS1, in order to be a complete sentence requires a space indication just in the same way the expression mS2 is completed by the space indication "in diesem Lande". The lacking space indication of mS1, if reconstructed through syntactical analogy to the rest of the clause, has to be necessarily the expression "in diesem Stall". Thus, the parallel expressions mS1 and mS2 become complete and parallel clauses:

(SI.1'): "Wenn Haider kommt, dann herrscht Gerechtigkeit *in diesem Lande!*"

(SI.2'): "(Wenn Haider kommt), dann wird Ordnung gemacht *in diesem Lande!*"

(SI.3'): "(Wenn Haider kommt), dann wird ausgemistet *in diesem Stall!*"

Although we know that the expression "in diesem Stall" is not the explicit part of the sentence but has been omitted -- and it can be omitted because it is a necessary entailment of the expression "ausmisten" -- we may observe that both re-constructed versions of the former sentence relate to each other so closely that they can be combined and crossed with each other: First, they have a clause in common ("Wenn Haider kommt, ..."). Second, as if-then clauses, they contain expressions which equally indicate another -- lacking -- linguistic item as if they stood for another object than the explicit ones. The space-indications "in diesem Stall" and "in diesem Lande" indicate clearly nothing other than the one thing which is not mentioned explicitly. This is the proper name of the country, i. e. Austria. But, both "Stall" and "Austria" have been omitted in the sentence. From this, we have enough reasons provided by the syntactical structure of the

sentence and by background implications of the items used to make the following inference:

The house-like space, i. e. the country in which order has to be established is **Austria**.

The house-like space i. e. the stall from which dung has to be removed is **Austria**.

This helps to make comprehensible that the **invisible referent** of both metaphorical expressions has been identified as Austria but it has been not represented within the sentence. It is, rather, a referent to which the metaphoric expressions relate only by means of anaphorical approach. It has been omitted for the same reason that the expression "in diesem Stall" has not been used which seems to be speaker's avoidance of putting Austria together with a stall, to compare them and to translate or interpret them using one another. As a result, one may say that the real metaphor of the speaker, which has not been used, is the following one: "Austria is a stall." Instead, it has been replaced (metaphorized) by the next possible and the most closed metaphoric expression: "(es) wird ausgemistet".⁵

On this background, one has to consider the consequence that the speaker's appeal to a non-explicit assumption such as "This country, i. e. Austria, is a stall" may not have the status of a mere additional, albeit more deeply positioned, metaphor. It seems to have the status of an explanation. More precisely, the relation between two reconstructed sentences S1' and S2', if seen in the light of the basic metaphor-assumption "Austria is a stall", seems not to be the assumed one, namely that the more convenient or more literal expression mS2 ("(es) wird Ordnung gemacht!") explains, translates or interprets mS1 ("(es) wird ausgemistet!"), but quite the opposite. The basic metaphor-assumption that Austria (may) be a stall, provides a **more concrete** explanation for the very usual and quite trivial expression "Es wird Ordnung gemacht". The expression "Es wird ausgemistet" tells (or better: indicates) what kind of "order making" and "justice" is intended. Namely that of "ausmisten", of cleaning "dung" away.

III. Answering Metaphor: A Means of Acting "Really"?

The linguistic analysis of metaphoric expressions which are contained in (S1) has led to the result that the content of linguistic items is not to be described in terms of literal language such as *'Es wird ausgemistet'* because this country is a house-like space in which disorder has reached the lowest (stall-like) level, but because the insight providing assumption is given by another, non-explicit but even harsher metaphor than mS1: *Austria is a stall*. However, the most important feature of this metaphoric expression is not that it says something about something, not that it is a kind of constative, but that **itself has not been uttered**. Therefore, as I would like to suggest, the sense of this metaphor is not, and cannot be, to **say something about** Austria, but rather to do something in Austria: namely, "ausmisten", i.e. "clean dung away". Hence, being forced to

move in circle, we inevitably turn back to the initial metaphor of the sentence. Still, it is not without some cognitive gain. The expression "ausmisten" is no more to be considered as an inconvenient metaphor stemming from the peasant-language. Instead, it is a "normal" expression whose literality is provided by the background assumption that this country is meant of as a stall. The relationship between two metaphoric items, between one which is an expression and one which is a tacit assumption, can comprehensively be described in terms of anaphora which relates to the syntagmatic axis of speech: The two metaphors do not just replace or explain but **supply** each other. The first one (mS1: "Es wird ausgemistet") indicates - and implies - that the other one (bmA: "Austria is a stall") is "working", i. e. providing, in the background, an emotionally loaded tacit assumption about the ultimately "bad state of reality" which has not necessarily to be formulated as an explicit statement. Austria is being imagined, not as comparable to a disordered house, but as a dung-overloaded stall.

However, this judgment, being itself metaphorical, seems to carry some "real" content but is not transported by the expression itself. We still have to admit that a metaphor is a metaphor, we know that neither Austria nor another country is a stall: Additionally, we can only deliberate if it is *like* a stall. Hence the "real content" of expressions like mS1 cannot by definition be provided by any insightful competence of the speaker of S1 to make statements about his country or by searching for the real meaning of his rhetorical figures. (As a matter of fact, his statements are largely contested by his political opponents.) The real content can only be sought for in other real procedures insofar as it may be proven that the speech items of speaker's discourse become formative parts of the discourse of other political subjects. In order to explain this, it is necessary to take into consideration another public speech item which is the result of the one which has been analyzed so far.

Shortly after the utterance of mS1, Austrian farmers protested against the policy of the Government and used, among other slogans, a very similar expression to the one I have been analyzing. They carried a poster with the slogan:

(S H): "Wir **misten** selbst aus"

It is obvious that this slogan is meant as an answer to the expression mS1. However -- and this is the crucial point -- we know this not because the protest meeting of Austrian peasants in Vienna took place after the election meeting of FPÖ in Klagenfurt, and even not because it is a kind of citation -- of repeating the verb "ausmisten".⁶ Instead, one may observe that the slogan "Wir misten selbst aus" (furtheron abbreviated as mS3) contains a further element, namely the reflexive pronoun "selbst" which alone indicates that the slogan is an answer and not just another sample of exploiting the ausmisten-verb. The expression mS3 implies univocally, by means of exclusion, that it is **We** and **not** an **Other** who is to perform the action indicated but in the same time it indicates that there is or there was another - albeit unidentified - speaker to perform the same. Thus, the expression mS3, while citing the initial slogan, does not say who the speaker

is but indicates that there has been one. It simply marks - or reminds of - his absence and thus re-presents him regardless of the question as to whether the speakers of mS3 agree or disagree with the speaker of mS1, whether they follow his political ideas or not.

Therefore, it is the non-identical element "self" which provides a significant difference between the two expressions, and ensures that mS3 is a citation or, better, an answer to mS1. It is only this answer which provides that mS1 become a real event and not just a rhetorical item of speech. However, it is not real in the sense that peasants in reality perform the action indicated (ausmisten) in front of the Austrian parliament.⁷ It is real in the sense that people who usually perform the action and use the word "ausmisten" -- i. e. people who are expected to be the normal user of the metaphor "ausmisten" when engaged in other contexts than peasant activities -- appear in reality to use the expression in a new, improper, but strictly definable context, which is the political struggle. This very special group of people -- farmers or peasants -- are the only instance apt to give the metaphor expressed in mS1 an aspect of reality, albeit by using another metaphor (that in mS3). Thus, the reality of the metaphor is not provided by approaching the literal meaning -- by performance or another means whatever -- but by a kind of applying the metaphor which had (approximately two weeks before) been uttered by another speaker, to one self. Thus, as suggested above, the repetition of the metaphor in mS1 turns out to be not just another sample of the same figure, but a real answer to it. This is provided by a small mark of difference, namely by the pronoun "self" which indicates both the real performer of the application of metaphor (peasants as a social group) and a completely new aspect of this performance: namely its character as being a re-definition of the people calling them "our-selves". This becomes visible if we transform grammatically the metaphoric expression mS3 as follows:

(mS3-a): "Wir sind es, die ausmisten", and

(mS3-b): "Wir sind die Ausmister".

The formal transformation of the sentence SII (expression mS3) into the fictive sentences mS3-a and mS3-b indicated above reveals that the self-application of the metaphor by farmers entails a two-step-process of, first, self-identification ("Wir sind es, die ausmisten") and, second, self-denomination or re-naming themselves ("Wir sind die Ausmister") which is the answer to a preceding act of denomination (mS1), be it intentional or not, be it real or not. On this background, the version mS3-a, "Wir sind es, die ausmisten!" has to be read as "We are the ones, who have been appealed to by "es wird ausgemistet!"⁸ In other words, the expression mS3 ("Wir misten selbst aus!"), as a case of self-application of the metaphor mS1, appears to be a self-implemented quest for interpolation or denomination by another speaker, i.e. by another subject of speech. Accordingly, the metaphoric expression mS1 cannot be considered as an improper or inconvenient metaphor any more, but as the most proper and convenient transporter (metaphor) of political messages and, at once, the

medium in which **political events take place** regardless of whether the speakers of mS3 are or are not direct political followers of the speaker of mS1. The real interaction is taking place as their mutual re-cognition through rhetorical means of a commonly shared language and it lasts as long as the metaphoric process is capable of providing a common sense. Still, this common sense is, again, not identifiable by other means than by the metaphor "ausmisten".⁹ Based on the above, one can say that a political event is re-presented through (by means of) an **event within the language**. Hence, it is exactly and only the answer to the initial metaphor - i.e. a further rhetorical means of language of the same order as the initial expression - which casts light upon the specific character of the metaphor as being a practical means of politics and not "merely" a style figure of speech which could be replaceable with another. It is the promissive illocutionary force of mS3¹⁰ that clearly recalls the promissive illocutionary force of the initial sentence S1 in which mS1 is embedded and in which the illocutionary force of promise or announcement is covered up by a more complicated syntactical structure than in mS3: .

"Wenn Haider kommt, dann **wird** die Ordnung gemacht, dann **herrscht** Gerechtigkeit in diesem Lande, dann **wird** ausgemistet (...) !"

It is clear that in this sentence, in difference to mS3, where the action of performing depends on no further condition ("Wir misten aus!"), the performance of action indicated (ausmisten, Ordnung machen) is being made dependent on the condition indicated by the when/if-clause. Given that the German conjunction "wenn" indicates both temporal and/or hypothetical condition, it becomes clear that the illocutionary force of the sentence is due to an internal drama of transforming the ambiguity of conditions into univocity of meaning -- namely into the temporal (and more real) instead of temporal-and-hypothetical (and less real) one. Hence, the promissive strength of the sentence is provided only as long - and insofar - as the speaker is able to avoid the hypothetical conditionality of his speech (being elected or not) or, more precisely, to convert the hypothetical status of the content of sentence into a performative strength of utterance (as if he already had been elected). This conversion has been provided by choosing particular means of promissive speech: The hypothetical character of the German conjunction "wenn" in the first clause ("Wenn Haider kommt, ...") appears recuperated by the impersonal passive form of the verb "ausmisten" (cf. "Es wird ausgemistet") which, in this context, does not indicate a constative sense but is an imperative saying which indicates **what** has to be done while omitting further information as to **who** is **supposed** to perform the action (subject told) or **who** is the **author** of the saying (subject of the utterance). The effect of this sample of imperative speech is **anonymity/impersonality of actors** and **immediacy of performing** the action. As it is known, this is a means characteristic of indirect ordering to small children to perform actions such as sleeping, eating, going to toilet etc. -- an ordering about which and on the ground of which there is no further discussion, no deliberation and, consequently, no "discursive procedure".

Thus the promissive character of the sentence turns out to be an imperative speech act projected into the future and it necessarily adopts the sense of annunciation of what is inevitably going to happen (Ordnung machen by ausmisten) or even of revelation about the future state of affairs (Gerechtigkeit). But in order to give the promise real strength, the content of the annunciation has to appear as **already realized**. To this purpose the sentence is in need of an authority which cannot rely on hypothetical condition (such as being elected by sufficient number of people or not). Also, the authority needed is not -- and cannot be -- given by any other instance than the speaker himself but it still must not be identical with him if it is expected to provide more power than the speaker himself, as a singular person and normal human being, is able to. Thus, it is exactly the quest for a higher authority than the speaker himself which is needed for a promissive sentence to be a **performative speech act of annunciation** (or a self-fulfilling necessity), but also it is this quest for authority which necessarily causes a splitting within the subject of the saying into a subject of utterance and a subject of the sentence. The speaker of the sentence -- and this is very much visible from the sentence which has been cited at the beginning -- speaks of himself, unlike all other protagonists of the current election campaign, in the third person singular: "Wenn Haider kommt, ..."

However, speaking in that way does not indicate in the first line a possible infantile feature of his person or of his political language game. It is rather the case that he infantilizes the political audience in the country. But beyond this complicated issue, one can see that this very peculiar feature of his discourse indicates that he, in order to provide authority to his speech and to legitimate his political goals and discursive practice, appeals to an instance which is positioned **without** or **beyond** the currently defined political field of the Austrian society which is the strongly parliamentary democracy. This instance of self-legitimation seems to be the **language** itself (Austrian German) which serves, being the commonly shared medium of all political participants, as a **medium of re-unification** of a badly dispersed nation. Henceforth, the instance appealed to is not and cannot be a particular political idea or conception since it could become an object of discursive and rational struggle among political participants. However, in order to approach this issue, one should necessarily take into consideration further items of speaker's language use and pass to other levels of analysis and interpretation. Since this cannot be provided by now, the above analysis must suffice to indicate the problem.

¹ However, the genesis and function of metaphors have an answer to this claim too: if metaphors are necessary and irreplaceable, then they belong to the group of *katachresis* (i.e. the main group of so-called "dead metaphor" like "leg" for a part of furniture). Therefore, the following assumption about metaphors seems to be a necessary consequence: in order to be irreplaceable, metaphor must not be re-conciliated with the function of the literal or to pretend to stand for the literal. Instead, metaphor has to insist on being wrongly/improperly placed. A metaphor, in order to be comprehensive, must be nothing else but a wrongly placed name.

² Although the quotation contains many details to consider because of their content (Ordnung, Gerechtigkeit), I will focus on the first line and upon one formal detail which is relevant for the following analysis. It is the order of appearing of if-then clauses within the sentence (first "dann wird Ordnung gemacht", second "dann herrscht Gerechtigkeit", third "dann wird ausgemistet").

³ According to the conceptualist explanation of metaphor (cf. Lakoff/Johnson), it is possible to explain our every day use of metaphoric language by appealing to deeper positioned metaphoric conceptions which serve to explain the logic and conceptual motivation of the sample used. Thus, the expression "ausmisten", designating a space-bound action, implies that state and society are imagined as space-like or physical items -- more precisely, as a house. The additional moment, which is moral rather than ontological, would be then that houses are commonly imagined as land or peasant houses in which, among many other aspects, the distinction between order and disorder, between the human sphere and the sphere of animals is clearly drawn. Thus the relation between a house and a stall can be explained as a relationship of negative analogy. Nevertheless, it does not seem possible to thematize and to explain why a particular metaphor, be it a surface or a deep assumption metaphor, has been used instead of another possible or, as in our case, why a metaphor has been omitted. Also, it seems important to mention that the background metaphoric assumption "Austria is a stall" cannot be, in relation to the metaphoric expression mS1 ("es wird ausgemistet"), taken as a more general or conceptual metaphor: "Austria" and "stall" are not terms for abstract items such as "building", "space", but one singular and one general term. Therefore, the metaphor "Austria is a stall" is not more general and not more "conceptual" than the expression mS1. Consequently, the relationship between these two metaphors is not to be described in terms of logic of general and singular terms but in terms of concurrent, competent signifiers indicating one another.

In terms of semiotic theory of language, we are to deal with procedures within the sphere of signifiers and thus we move on the so-called syntagmatic axis of speech (in difference to the so-called paradigmatic one, cf. Jakobson) which provides that items of speech do not replace but indicate or associate one another. This means that, while occupying a place in the flow of speech (of the text), items indicate that this is a place of another possible item which fits within the configuration of the place. In taking place, the speech-items each replace one another.

⁴ Namely, it is obvious that the expression "(es) wird Ordnung gemacht" is more convenient than the expression in mS1. It is also obvious that the latter one is at least partly explained by the former. In German, one uses the expression "Ordnung machen" rather than "ausmisten" which is not understood as a metaphoric item of speech. Rather, it is a general or abstract formula for the idea of "put things in their proper places". In this sense, as used for the abstract idea of order, it is certainly literal or more literal than the expression mS1 which is, in contrast, more concrete and particular. On the other side, the second if-then clause, "dann herrscht Gerechtigkeit", contains an abstract item "Gerechtigkeit",

and is in this sense to relate to the *Ordnung*-clause, but it is logically more particular and in this sense more close to the *ausmisten*-clause. However, both if-then clauses with abstract items have one feature in common: namely, in contrast to the *ausmisten*-clause, their items have no definable content and seem to be in need of further explanation. In this respect they differ equally from the third if-then clause and, in the next steps of analysis, I will treat them as one.

⁵ In this point professor Hankiss disagrees strongly with my conclusion. He argues that the background implication is not "Austria is a stall" but rather "Somebody has made Austria into a stall". As it may be clear from my analysis till this point, I do not believe that the sentence "Austria is a stall" is the only background assumption possible of the metaphoric expression *mSI* but the **analytically next possible** one. (The sentence "Somebody has made Austria into a stall" is not a metaphoric sentence although it does contain a metaphoric item.) This is provided by the fact that, first, the German verb "*aus-misten*" implies a space indication to be performed ("*aus*" as in contrast to "*ein*", "*auf*", "*ab*"), second, "*aus-misten*" is a stall-bound activity and, third, in this very sample of speech, the accent lies upon the performance of the activity indicated (cf. the impersonal verb form "(es) wird *ausgemistet*") and not upon the performer. As a matter of fact, the speaker of *SI* does not say "Wenn ich komme, dann wird *ausgemistet*" but speaks of himself in the third person singular ("Wenn Haider kommt, ..."). Thus, any direct connection between the activity called "*ausmisten*" and the performer of the activity appears broken by the asymmetry in the grammatical structure of the main clause ("Wenn Haider kommt, ..."). It indicates a person as logical and grammatical subject of the sentence and the if-then clauses which are built upon impersonal construction of the verb ("*wird ausgemistet*", "*wird Ordnung gemacht*"). Therefore, what is indicated by the sentence is the so-called objective state of things and a need for intervening in it rather than reference to subjects of action. Since possible subjects of actions indicated (be it "*ausmisten*" or "*Mist bauen*") are grammatically and ontologically **external** to the speech item, they may be implied (and expected) only on another level of consideration which is interpretative and not analytical. Furthermore, I will be arguing in the final section of the paper that the speaker of *SI*, using impersonal passive forms of verb, aims at impersonality, objective necessity and even imperativity of the action to be performed ("*ausmisten*") and presents himself as an instrument of this necessity. The "subjects" accused by the speaker of *SI* to "have made Austria into a stall" are not parts of his metaphoric speech, they are rather objects of his direct reference. Accordingly, he does not need metaphors as a means of debate with political opponents; he refers to them not as subjects told but rather as subjects said about (i.e. as objects). On this background, another **analytically next possible** metaphoric assumption for "*ausmisten*" should be, instead of "Somebody has made Austria into a stall", as I believe, the expression *Etwas ist Mist in Österreich* ("Something is/has become dung in this country (= Austria)"). For this expression -- albeit being analytically trivial because "*aus-misten*" is a verbal derivative of the noun "*Mist*" so that one cannot say "*Mist ausmisten*" -- explains clearly a further peculiar feature of the

political attitude of the speaker of SI, namely his disrespect for his political opponents: they are not opponents to be struggled with but to be thrown away (like dung) together with the "Ordnung" they are responsible for.

Finally, the advantage of assuming metaphoric expressions like "Something is dung in this country" or the first one indicated above ("Austria is a stall") for the purposes of my procedure, which is in the first line formal and analytical rather than interpretative, is that these metaphors clearly indicate those background assumptions (be they physical or moral) which are necessary for visible metaphoric speech items to function as literally meant expressions. For only if one assumes that something is (like) dung or is (like) a stall can one utilize expressions like "ausmisten" and mean so.

⁶ Interestingly enough, it is exactly the citation of the expression which cannot be used as to demonstrate the connection between the two slogans and two political events: the verb "ausmisten" is an item of the normal peasant every day language and it is the farmers who are expected to use it.

⁷ For if they had done this, the real action called ausmisten would have been nothing but another type of metaphor, a falling back to mere metaphoric, allegoric or symbolic performance. (But had they really tried to re-literalize the metaphor by performing the action of ausmisten, it would have inevitably first provoked laughter in the public and the intention to protest might have failed since everybody knows that peasants perform the action of ausmisten literally and expects them to do so, but not in the wrong place. Had they done it, they would have done the opposite: namely "Mist bauen". Conversely, every other possible social group except peasants would be allowed to perform the action of ausmisten literally because it then would have a symbolic value of saying "something else".)

⁸ On this basis, it is directly comparable to the famous slogan "Wir sind das Volk" used by people during Leipzig demonstrations from 1989 which, due to another logic of rhetoric, soon turned to the slogan "Wir sind ein Volk!"

⁹ Hence, this metaphor is not more a means of understanding between speakers than it can be a means of misunderstanding since it is not required that both sides really mean the same thing. What one of them considers "a stall" in which one has to "ausmisten", the other need not necessarily share. What they share is the indirect approach to one item they have in common: the critique of government. Whether the output of this criticism is the same on both sides is not a clear issue. It depends on the political behavior of both -- or of any possible -- participants in the metaphoric communication, since it is, by definition, more an indicator of behavior than an abstract statement about state of things.

¹⁰ It becomes visible if we correctly transform the present tense of SII "Wir misten selbst aus!" into the future tense as follows: "Wir werden selbst ausmisten!"