International conference

WITTGENSTEIN AND HEGEL – NORMATIVITY AND RATIONALITY

Zagreb (Croatia)
September 9–11, 2024

ORGANISERS

Alexander Berg
University of Konstanz
Germany

Karlo Gardavski
University of Zagreb
Croatia

Denys Kaidalov
Charles University in Prague
Czech Republic

Bruna Picas Prats
University of Barcelona
Spain

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT

**Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
University of Zagreb**

Croatian Philosophical Society

**Faculty of Philosophy
University of Sarajevo**

INFORMATION AND CONTACTS

Alexander Berg
University of Konstanz
alexander.berg75@icloud.com

Karlo Gardavski
University of Zagreb
karlo.gardavski@gmail.com

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INTRODUCTION

Wittgenstein once said: "Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different." (*Recollections of Wittgenstein*, ed. by Rush Rhees, Oxford 1981, p. 157.) This difference between Hegel's and Wittgenstein's thinking has been seldom raised despite being, from a contemporary point of view, particularly pertinent.

According to Hegel, the purpose of philosophy is to consider the thoughts of its respective periods. While Wittgenstein was a focal point of 20th century philosophical discourse, it was Hegel's philosophy that brought the essential discourses of the 19th century together. After this convergence different movements began to individuate themselves from his system of thinking, allowing for the development of the analytical-continental split in the 20th century. This now-outdated conflict, which was promoted by Bradley and Russell, took for granted Hegel and Wittgenstein's opposing positions and is being replaced by a continuous progression and differentiation of several authors, schools, and philosophical traditions, which themselves are guided by various interests, shades, and transitions.

The term 'split', however, is anachronistic, problematic, and, therefore, the two, Hegel und Wittgenstein, must be reconciled. It is because of the lack of overlap between these two internally developed spheres of thought that this schism still exists in 20th century philosophical scholarship. This stems from the split and the institutions themselves. Subsequently, each has a serious interest in the other's research, specifically how it might impact their own.

The development is already evident in the tendency to identify a progression from a 'Kantian' to a 'Hegelian' phase of analytical philosophy as well as in the extension of right and left Hegelian approaches by modern and postmodern concepts. In this process it has become quite clear that the systemic interests of Wittgenstein and Hegel – be it in philosophy of mind, logic, philosophy of science or in other areas – coincide stronger than anticipated by one-dimensional, traditional paradigmatic analyses. This recognition of shared systematic interests opens up new constructive and productive ways of relating both paradigmatic theories.

Taking this into consideration, it is reasonable to suppose that assessing the difference between Wittgenstein and Hegel will outline different intersections of 21st century variously differentiated philosophical discourse. We hope that not only will the contemplation of Hegel's thinking bring about a deeper understanding of Wittgenstein's research, but that Wittgensteinian scholarship will also allow for new answers to old Hegelian problems.

For this reason and with the same goal, a group of researchers gathers and organizes conferences from 2017 (Technical University in Dresden) to today (University of Zagreb).

PROGRAMME OF
THE CONFERENCE

MONDAY, September 9, 2024

9:30–10:00   **Opening of the conference** (Room 1)

10:00–11:30   **Plenary session** (Room 1)

ELENA FICARA (University of Paderborn, Germany): Hegel and Wittgenstein: Forerunners of Paraconsistency?

ALEXANDER BERG (University of Zurich, Switzerland): *Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy* or the Peculiar Nature of Philosophy (Book Presentation)

11:30   *Coffee break*

11:55–12:40   **Session 1** (Room 1)

11:55–12:40   DAVOR LAUC (University of Zagreb, Croatia): Identity, Similarity, and Contextuality in Hegel's *Logic* and Wittgenstein's *Investigations*

11:55–12:40   **Session 2** (Room 2)

11:55–12:40   KONRAD WYSZKOWSKI (University of Warsaw, Poland): Knowledge of Truth and Cognition of Verisimilitude: Hegel and the Problem of the Ground for Cognitive Norms

12:40   *Lunch break*

14:20–15:50   **Session 1** (Room 1)

14:20–15:05   CARLA CARMONA (University of Seville, Spain): A Performative Hinge Epistemology at the Intersection of Wittgenstein and Hegel
15:05–15:50   MATE PENAVA (University of Zadar, Croatia): Normativity of Forms of Life

14:20–15:50	**Session 2** (Room 2)
14:20–15:05	MATIJA VIGATO (University of Zagreb, Croatia): Hegel's and Wittgenstein's Influence on Sellars' Critique of the Myth of the Given
15:05–15:50	KWING-YUI WONG (Soochow University, Taiwan): Unraveling the Connections: Wittgenstein's and Hegel's Perspectives on Rule-Following

      15:50   *Coffee break*

16:15–17:45	**Session 1** (Room 1)
16:15–17:00	MARTIN HERGOUTH (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia): Failure of Immediacy, Necessity of Immediacy and the Function of Writing
17:00–17:45	SIMONE NOTA (Trinity College Dublin, Ireland): Wittgenstein the Naturalist?

16:15–17:45	**Session 2** (Room 2)
16:15–17:00	IBEN BOLLAERT & CATO ANDRIESSEN (University of Ghent, Belgium): The Absolute System of Definitions: On Hegel's and Frege's Notion of Definitions
17:00–17:45	NICOLAS CUEVAS (University of Bayreuth, Germany): Truth-Conditions as Conditions of Correct Application: Semantic Normativity and Pragmatic Guidelines

10:00–11:30   **Plenary session** (Room 1)

HANS-JOHANN GLOCK (University of Zurich, Switzerland): Was Wittgenstein a Rulesian?

DENYS KAIDALOV (Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic): On Logical Psychologism

11:30   *Coffee break*

11:55–12:40   **Session 1** (Room 1)

11:55–12:40   GURPREET RATTAN (University of Toronto, Canada): Disagreement and Notational Advantage in a Solipsistic Language

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11:55–12:40   **Session 2** (Room 2)

11:55–12:40   LUCA MORELLI FONSECA (Boston College, USA): Wittgenstein's Language Games: An Investigation of the Non-Representational Capacity of Language

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12:40   *Lunch break*

14:20–15:50   **Session 1** (Room 1)

14:20–15:05   FLORIAN RIEGER (University of Basel, Switzerland): The Idea of Practice in Wittgenstein

15:05–15:50   RAMESH DHEERAVATH (University of Hyderabad, India): Methodological Differences in Hegel's Dialectics and Wittgenstein's Language Games: Implications for Normativity and Rationality

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14:20–15:50   **Session 2** (Room 2)

14:20–15:05   NIKOLA JANDRIĆ (University of Belgrade, Serbia): Expressive Rationality in Later Wittgenstein: A Novel, Socratic Reading of the Rule-following Considerations

15:05–15:50   LUCAS SANZEY (University of Lorraine, France): On Reception and Use of Wittgenstein in Philosophy of Law

15:50   *Coffee break*

16:15–17:00   **Session 1** (Room 1)

16:15–17:00   DAVID LINDEMAN (Georgetown University, USA): Hegel, Heidegger, Wittgenstein – Identity and Difference: A Note on the Culmination

17:00–17:45   DAVID PALME (Frankfurt, Germany): Contradiction as a Form of Life: 20th Century Moral Philosophy through the Lens of Wittgenstein's Work

16:15–17:00   **Session 2** (Room 2)

16:15–17:00   VIRGINIA SORO (University of Lausanne, Switzerland): Intellect in Action: McDowell reading Hegel after Wittgenstein

17:00–17:45   DOMINIK MÜLLER (ETH Zürich, Switzerland): Wittgenstein, Science, and the Law of Causality

WEDNESDAY, September 11, 2024

10:00–11:30   **Plenary session** (Room 1)

KARLO GARDAVSKI (University of Zagreb, Croatia) & KENAN ŠLJIVO (University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina): Norms We Live By: Temporality and Rule Following in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*

PAOLO TRIPODI (University of Turin, Italy): Wittgenstein, Dialectics, and 'Bourgeois' Thought

11:30   *Coffee break*

11:55–14:10   **Session 1** (Room 1)

11:55–12:40   KRYSTIAN BOGUCKI (Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland): How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Saying-Showing Distinction

12:40–13:25   LORENZO CAMMI (Verona, Italy): Logic of Madness in Hegel and Wittgenstein: The Struggle between Mind and World

13:25–14:10   ANDREW BRIDGES (California State University, Fullerton, USA): A Hegelian Reflection of the Expansive Nature of the Concept of the Placebo Effect in the Context of Coherent Rationalities and Public Health

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11:55–12:40   **Session 2** (Room 2)

11:55–12:40   QINYI LUO (University of California, Riverside, USA): Finding Justifications in Practices: Hegel and Wittgenstein on Normativity

12:40–13:25   GIUSEPPA BELLA (University of Catania, Italy): Überlegungen zur logischen Normativität bei Hegel und Wittgenstein

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14:15   **Closing of the conference** (Room 1)

ABSTRACTS OF THE PLENARY LECTURES

ALEXANDER BERG
(University of Zurich, Switzerland)
alexander.berg75@icloud.com

Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy
or the Peculiar Nature of Philosophy
(Book Presentation)

In my presentation I will introduce the anthology *Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy: Logic, Language, Life* (eds. Alexander Berg & Denys Kaidalov, Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, [October] 2024). The new anthology explores the profound connections and tensions between Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical work and the traditions of classical German philosophy, focusing on the intertwining themes of *logic*, *language*, and *life*.

Wittgenstein and Classical German Philosophy: Logic, Language, Life...

Wittgenstein's philosophical contributions have become emblematic of the twentieth-century philosophy of language, significantly influencing the trajectory of analytic philosophy. Despite the analytic tradition's early detachment from continental philosophy, Wittgenstein maintained a cultural and philosophical affinity with the intellectual traditions of nineteenth-century Europe, particularly those rooted in Austrian culture and German thought.

The anthology thus builds on an earlier project (*Wittgenstein and Hegel: Reevaluation of Difference*, eds. Jakub Mácha & Alexander Berg, Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 2019) exploring the relationship between Wittgenstein and Hegel, and from there expands its scope to include other key figures such as Kant, Fichte and Schelling, as well as literary and cultural influences such as Goethe, Schlegel and Herder. Together, the fifteen contributors examine how Wittgenstein's philosophy intersects with these thinkers, revealing both overlooked congruencies and sometimes underrepresented tensions.

The presentation will outline how the anthology is structured around three central themes: Logic, Language and Life. These themes are explored through a series of interrelated chapters, each of which offers insights into the complex relationships

between Wittgenstein's ideas and the broader tradition of classical German philosophy. By juxtaposing Wittgenstein's work with these earlier traditions, the book aims to uncover new connections and critical perspectives that can enhance our understanding of his philosophy in its historical context.

… or the Peculiar Nature of Philosophy

Following from these investigations, the peculiar nature of philosophy and philosophizing seems to be revealed in the examination of the limits and possibilities of *logic*, *language*, and *life*. Philosophy not only seeks systematic knowledge, but also reflects on the limitations of these systems, leading to the development of non-standard theories of logic. In this context, philosophising emerges as an activity that constantly oscillates between theory and practice, logic and aesthetics, scepticism and pragmatism. Wittgenstein's work, particularly in relation to the close interweaving of logic, language and forms of life, shows that philosophy seeks not only intellectual clarity but also deeper insight into the practical dimension of life. This highlights the close relationship between the theoretical considerations of philosophy and their practical application in social and aesthetic contexts. Philosophy is thus characterised as a critical, reflective practice that examines both the abstract and concrete aspects of human existence, constantly seeking to understand and mediate their tensions and paradoxes.

ELENA FICARA
(University of Paderborn, Germany)
elena.ficara@uni-paderborn.de

Hegel and Wittgenstein:
Forerunners of Paraconsistency?

According to a common characterization, a paraconsistent system is contradictory and non-trivial (Marconi 1984, 339), and "denying explosion is all that is required for a logic to be paraconsistent" (Weber 2021, 6). My paper is about the prehistory of this idea, with special focus on Hegel and Wittgenstein. I focus on the questions: Do Hegel's and Wittgenstein's works contain reflections on this line? If so, what do these reflections tell us about the possible connection between Hegel and Wittgenstein, and about the present state of paraconsistency?

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KARLO GARDAVSKI
(University of Zagreb, Croatia)
karlo.gardavski@gmail.com

KENAN ŠLJIVO
(University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina)
kenan.sljivo@ff.unsa.ba

Norms We Live By:
Temporality and Rule Following
in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*

One of the central concepts of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* is language games. A language game is a form of life, which is bound to some rule(s). Language games are as diverse as the rules we use. The question that arises is: is there an infinite number of language games? If there really is an infinity of language games, how is it possible to "transition" from one game to another? This multiplicity certainly has its own time order, in the sense that we accept the rules and adopt them temporally in a different order. The fact is that at the beginning of our language evolution, we are exposed to rules that should be a framework for functioning in a linguistic environment. We do not adopt the rules all at once, nor do we use the words in linguistic practice in all (possible) ways, they must have an order. With this, we do not question the multiplicity of linguistic practices, nor do we want to advocate some form of reductionism or atomism in (late) Wittgenstein. There is no hierarchy of rules/norms, but there is a temporal order. The rules of language games are heterogeneous and holistic, but the following question remains: How can we move from one language game to another? Language games must share some meanings that make up our "*meaning*" core. Even when there is a change in meaning, there must be an order of adoption that made it possible. For further justification of the presented views, we will offer the principle of *temporal priority of norms*. Our goal is to show, through the ontogenetic-naturalistic point of view, that through the language development of certain participants, in linguistic practices, there must be a set of temporally prioritized norms that are the first in order (of adoption), which serve as a framework that enables further movement into new language games. We will advocate that this chronology must have its source in what is called an *accredited subject* (Michael Williams), i.e. a normative authority (a reliable source of information that regulates language games, but is also exposed to regulation), which has acquired its deontic status of reliability through redistribution of normative attitudes or normative acts of *entitlement and commitment* (Robert Brandom).

HANS-JOHANN GLOCK
(University of Zurich, Switzerland)
glock@philos.uzh.ch

Was Wittgenstein a Rulesian?

Linguistic rules seem to play a central role in Wittgenstein's oeuvre, especially because 'grammatical propositions' seem to be central both to his conception of necessity and to method of philosophizing. Nevertheless, interpreters as diverse as Cavell, Hanfling, Rundle, Horwich, Wikforss and Schroeder have advanced 'unruly' readings of Wittgenstein. Their common denominator is that that they disparage, downplay or substantially qualify Wittgenstein's talk of languages and meaning as constituted by logico-syntactical or 'grammatical rules'. This presentation rejects their main exegetical arguments, Wittgenstein became suspicious of his own initial understanding logico-linguistic rules, evident in his 'calculus model' of language. Far from abandoning the idea that meaning is constituted by rules, however, he fought his way through to a down-to-earth conception of how 'grammar' guides competent speakers through normative practices of explanation and correction. It demonstrates that such normativism is not undermined by the famous 'rule-following considerations', and it critically discusses the suggestion that for Wittgenstein language is a normative phenomenon, yet without being guided by rules.

DENYS KAIDALOV
(Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic)
denys.kaidalov@ff.cuni.cz

On Logical Psychologism

This paper addresses the issue of logical psychologism, the view that logic is either a part of psychology or must be based on psychology. The primary aim is to explore strategies for defending logic against the incursion of psychology. The paper first examines the relationship between logic and psychology in Hegel's philosophy. Hegel's logic focuses on objective thought, which he equates with truth. For Hegel, logic is concerned with the determinations of thought ('categories') in their capacity to grasp truth. He rejects the idea that laws of thought can be discovered through observation or introspection or that they can be arbitrarily set or absolutely fixed. Instead, logical laws are normative; they show us what correct thinking is and how we should think if we are to think correctly. However, he also rejects the prejudice that one learns to think through logic. Thus, 'truth' is seen as a norm of thought, and logic is the study of this norm. The paper then discusses Hegel's non-psychological conception of conceptual content, referring to Brandom's view that conceptual content is articulated through normative relations – what one ought to do – rather than something derived directly from actual behaviour or dispositions. Finally, the paper considers anti-psychologism in Wittgenstein's work. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein claims: "Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science" (TLP 4.1121). Later, he argues that philosophy does not analyse the phenomenon of thinking but rather the concept of thinking, focusing on the application of words (PI §383). The analysis underlines the need to protect logic from psychological reductionism to maintain its normative and conceptual integrity.

PAOLO TRIPODI
(University of Turin, Italy)
paolo.tripodi@unito.it

Wittgenstein, Dialectics, and 'Bourgeois' Thought

In 1923, György Lukács interpreted the Hegelian distinction between understanding and reason as the opposition between "bourgeois thought" and the dialectical "point of view of totality". He used an example from Marx: Bourgeois thought sees a spinning jenny merely as a machine for spinning cotton. Motivated by "false consciousness", bourgeois thought places the machine within the narrow context of, say, classical political economy, thus limiting discourse to productivity and similar factors. However, placing it in broader historical-social contexts reveals that the spinning jenny is more than a machine – it is capital. This context exposes the contradictions in bourgeois thought and allows for discussions on labour exploitation and reification. By becoming aware of its own identity through work and struggle, the proletariat can grasp the objective nature of social totality.

In this talk I discuss Wittgenstein's relationship with these Hegelian-Marxist views, making three claims:

1. In criticizing Ramsey, Wittgenstein uses the term "bourgeois thinker" in a similar sense to the one just described (CV, 22). He also connects Hegelian dialectics and the viewpoint of totality ("everything is part of everything") (RPP I, § 339).
2. Wittgenstein's construction of language games – real or invented pieces of language introduced as terms of comparison for philosophical purposes – is (partly) comparable to the dialectical method of placing phenomena in different (wider or narrower) contexts.
3. For Wittgenstein, there is no room for the proletarian privileged standpoint; philosophy is an individual matter. However, in front of Malcolm's incredulity about the British government's plan to assassinate Hitler, he asked the equivalent of: what is the point of studying philosophy if one continues to think like a bourgeois thinker? (Malcolm 2001, 56–57)

Therefore: Wittgenstein acknowledges the Hegelian-Marxist terms of the question and partly applies the dialectical method, to provide an antidote to bourgeois thought.

ABSTRACTS OF THE CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

GIUSEPPA BELLA
(University of Catania, Italy)
bellagiusy29@gmail.com

Überlegungen zur logischen Normativität
bei Hegel und Wittgenstein

Das Grundprinzip von Hegels Logik besteht darin, dass die Logik die Bewegung der Realität (der Sache selbst) widerspiegeln muss; Wittgenstein behauptet, dass das Denken das logische Bild von Tatsachen ist. Für beide Philosophen basiert die Logik daher auf einer präzisen Norm: Sie muss nicht nur die logischen Prinzipien der Realität widerspiegeln, sondern auch die Bewegung der Realität, auf die sie anwendbar sind.

Dies erfordert ein prozessuales Umdenken des Grundsatzes der Identität und des Nicht-widerspruchs und damit der Rolle der logischen Negation, d. h. des notwendigen Werkzeugs für deren Anwendung. Der Zweck dieses Vortrags besteht in der Analyse einiger in den beiden Philosophien vorhandener Negationsmodelle und in der Erklärung ihrer normativen Form in Bezug auf die Anwendung logischer Kriterien und das begriffliche Verständnis der Prozessualität der Realität. Bei beiden Philosophen ist die Negation „relationaler" Art, das heißt, es stellt sich als ein Mittel dar, das die Gültigkeit des Kriteriums der Identität einer logischen Bestimmung mit sich selbst (und damit ihrer Entstehung) durch die Beziehung zum „Anderen" festlegt. Womit sich dieser „Andere" identifiziert, macht den Unterschied zwischen den beiden logischen Systemen aus und bestimmt die Art und Weise, in der die Negation für ihre Kriterien normativ ist. Das hier betrachtete Modell der Negation für Hegels Philosophie ist das inzwischen ausgereifte Modell der Wesenslogik: Das „Andere" ist das Negativ derselben logischen Bestimmung, die sich begründet, es ist sein eigenes Anderes. Die Negation ist also eine bestimmte Negation und hat eine relationale Form denotativ-prozessueller Art. In Wittgensteins *Tractatus* repräsentiert der „Andere" alles, was über die Bedeutungsgrenze der Sprache hinausgeht. Es ist keine Grenze des Denkens, für die man „das Negative des Denkens" denken müsste, also das, was nicht gedacht werden kann (in diesem Fall würde das in der Wesenslogik vorhandene Modell der Negation erneut in Analogie vorgeschlagen), sondern eher eine Grenze, die nur in der Sprache verfolgt werden kann. Das Modell der Negation kann daher als denotativ-inklusiv definiert werden: Die logischen Bestimmungen und die Konstitution ihrer Prinzipien werden auf der Grundlage der Beziehung

zum Ausschluss von etwas festgelegt, das nicht in einen Bedeutungshorizont fällt. In den Philosophischen Untersuchungen hingegen wird die Grenze der Bedeutung und damit des „Anderen" durch den Bezugskontext begrenzt. Das relationale Wesen der Negation wird betont, ihre normative Bedeutung hat jedoch nicht mehr eine stabil fixierte denotative Form, sondern eine abgrenzende Form, der in jede Bedeutungskonstruktion eingreift.

KRYSTIAN BOGUCKI
(Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland)
krystian.bogucki@ifispan.edu.pl

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Saying-Showing Distinction

In this talk I offer a positive account of saying and showing in the light of the resolute reading of the *Tractatus*.

Some orthodox readers of the *Tractatus* (Hacker 2000; Proops 2001) have suggested that the resolute reading implies a wholesale rejection of the saying-showing distinction, which makes the resolute reading a non-starter. Conant and Diamond (2004) have denied this charge, clarifying that they only reject the quasi-propositional interpretation of showing. However, Conant, Diamond, and other resolute readers have left open the question of how the saying-showing distinction should be properly understood. My aim is to fill this gap. I propose a positive story about the saying-showing distinction that allows the resolute readers to account for the crucial importance that Ludwig Wittgenstein ascribed to it.

My interpretation indicates that showing was not supposed to reveal spurious metaphysical properties of the world, such as the existence of simple objects, the truth of solipsism, and the very essence of the world (cf. Hacker 1986, 2002; McGuiness 2002; Pears 1987). It also contests that showing helps us to transcend the limits of saying, and that the method of the *Tractatus* rests on the ability of showing to disclose what cannot be said. On my reading, showing points to mundane and familiar properties, such as the entailment between propositions, the meanings of names, and the sense that a proposition possesses. In some cases, showing is just another way of presenting a property, and in some other cases showing does not even exclude saying. Previous readings of saying and showing have, among other things, not sufficiently taken into account the role of perspicuous notation in the *Tractatus*, and have thus misinterpreted and mythologised some of Wittgenstein's statements.

IBEN BOLLAERT
(University of Ghent, Belgium)
iben.bollaert@ugent.be

CATO ANDRIESSEN
(University of Ghent, Belgium)
cato.andriessen@ugent.be

The Absolute System of Definitions:
On Hegel's and Frege's Notion of Definitions

This paper investigates the philosophical line of thought connecting Wittgenstein and Hegel through a comparison of Hegel's and Frege's views on definitions. We argue that revisiting Frege in light of Hegel's philosophy of language and mathematics is essential for understanding the transition to Wittgenstein. Although Frege has been characterized as a strict critic of the German Idealist movement (Milkov 2015, 88), recent interpretations challenge this view by emphasizing Frege's historical and philosophical indebtedness to this tradition (e.g., Käufer 2005; Reed 2007; Hanna 2013; Hylton 2013; Milkov 2015). We further this discourse by examining how Hegel's and Frege's conceptions of definitions elucidate their philosophical projects. We assert that the definition serves a surprisingly similar function in both philosophies, particularly in regard to their respective notions of a logical system. This comparative analysis, together with Hegel's general conception of definitions, is underexplored if not absent in the scholarship of both authors. However, the role of definitions in Hegel's logical system is intriguing due to a fundamental ambiguity in Hegel's discussion of them. On the one hand, Hegel criticizes definitions as an immediate step in finite, theoretical and synthetic cognition ('theoretical mind' in Hegel's PoM), distinguishing them from axioms, divisions, and theorems (GL 708–713; EL §228–231). On the other hand, Hegel suggests that his entire system must be viewed as a series of definitions of the Absolute (EL §87). We will further analyze this ambiguity and its implications for Hegel's notion of an immanent philosophical system. Subsequently, we examine the role of definitions in Frege's philosophy, focusing on the letters to David Hilbert, in which Frege repeatedly criticizes Hilbert's conflation of definitions and axioms (PMC 34–38). This critique pervades Frege's entire body of work (e.g. GGA II §55–67, §68–85; CP 118–121, 273–284; PW 244) and is reflected in the growing literature on this topic (Boddy 2021; Horty 2009; Kremer 2019; Shieh 2008). Comparing both authors, we see an

equivalence between Hegel's definition as the universalizing of the particular in the broader unifying development between the subjective and objective idea to make a cognitive system possible, and Frege's definition as the place where sign and reference are constituted together, enabling the propositional form of sense and grounding a logical system. We conclude by returning to the broader influence of Hegel on post-Fregean philosophy, particularly Wittgenstein, in light of these considerations.

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ANDREW BRIDGES
(California State University, Fullerton, USA)
abridges@fullerton.edu

A Hegelian Reflection of the Expansive Nature of the Concept of the Placebo Effect in the Context of Coherent Rationalities and Public Health

This paper argues a Hegelian phenomenological approach for understanding the complexity of human activity can provide insight into the fields of medicine and public health when understanding the various forms of placebo and placebo effect. This paper first focuses on the distinctions Hegel makes, in his work *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, between his own phenomenological approach and the systems of Physiognomy and Phrenology. The focus is then turned to reflections on the contemporary relevance and application Hegel's distinction between his method and the method of Physiognomy and Phrenology have on contemporary scientific and philosophical disciplines. Particular attention is paid to the work "Hegel on Faces and Skulls", in which MacIntyre explores the relevance Hegel's criticisms of Phrenology and Physiognomy have for the fields of Neurophysiology and Genetics. Attention is also paid to Verene's insights concerning the relevance of Hegel's criticism for both Behaviorism and for Philosophical Psychology as well as to the insights Michael Inwood's work "Hegel's Critique of Physiognomy and Phrenology", concerning the indeterminacy of inner intentions. This paper then demonstrates in similar fashion how these criticisms of Hegel's are applicable to our concept of the placebo and the placebo effect. In doing so concepts such as an 'honest nocebo' are explored – in relation to rationality and normality – and applied to the phenomenon of a warning label and its rationality. The most salubrious fusion of medical treatment mediated by the placebo effect is also conceptually explored in an attempt to render Hegel's phenomenological approach coherent with rationalities involving the expansion of the placebo effect.

LORENZO CAMMI
(Verona, Italy)
lorenzo.cammi@gmail.com

Logic of Madness in Hegel and Wittgenstein:
The Struggle between Mind and World

My paper aims to consider the presuppositions of a logic of madness in Hegel and Wittgenstein; in particular, I tackle two issues: firstly, whether and how might be the case that a deviation in the logic of reason occur in the Hegelian world and in the Tractarian one; secondly, how the conflict between the two logics might take place. My starting point is Hegel's definition of madness as the contradiction between the subjective representation of the individual mind and the objective world.

On the one hand, to clarify the meaning of this contradiction I shed light on the distinction and the relation between the individual consciousness and Reason – which rules and imposes its norms on the world – by confronting the logic of madness and the logic of Reason. As a further step, I examine the possibility that the individual will makes its own representation of the world actual, by dealing with Hegel's understanding of literary and historical attempts of breaking established norms. On the other hand, I apply the idea of a logic of madness – in the Hegelian sense – to the *Tractatus*. In the first place, I investigate Wittgenstein's notion of the subject by distinguishing between the metaphysical and the empirical. After tackling the issue of whether this separation might be a first cause of madness for the empirical subject, I deal with the possibility that the latter is willing and is able to impose his own representation of actuality on the world.

Eventually, I show that, whereas in Hegel the fight between the subject and the world is the struggle between the subjective mind and Reason, in Wittgenstein the empirical subject directly confronts himself against the inflexible logic of the world. Moreover, I analyze the moral consequences of the supremacy of Reason or of the world over the subjective mind and of the possibility that the latter gets the better of actuality.

CARLA CARMONA
(University of Seville, Spain)
ccarmona@us.es

A Performative Hinge Epistemology
at the Intersection of Wittgenstein and Hegel

I propose a performative account of hinge epistemology (HE) by combining Wittgenstein's ([1953] 2009) understanding of language use with the dynamics of recognition articulated by Brandom's (2019) use of Hegel ([1807] 2018). Unlike Wittgenstein, who generally approaches the I–we relationship by calling attention to communities and the social imaginary, Brandom fundamentally explores the dyadic I–you relationship that occurs in our testimonial exchanges (cf. Brandom 2019, 284). The combination of both perspectives is useful to fight the eidetic understanding of hinges implied by some accounts of HE and to explain how hinges can change over time. My performative account of hinges has three main features: 1) there are hinges that enable and govern our ordinary epistemic practices, functioning as rules, 2) they are enacted and actualized in the specific actions of agents that participate in such practices, and 3) this makes room for the transformation and emergence of hinges. Against the background of Wittgenstein ([1953] 2009, §§241–242), I understand the idea that 'the meaning of a word is its use in language' (Wittgenstein [1953] 2009, §43) in the strong sense that in each application of a word speakers contribute to determining its field of application. Like Wittgenstein, Brandom (2019, 12) elucidates normativity by 'explaining discursive norms as the products of social practices'. For Brandom (2019, 9), discursive activity, understood as judgements, and these as the application of concepts, commits us as speakers since we undertake doxastic and practical responsibilities by binding ourselves to rules in the form of concepts. Likewise, our actions in daily life also bind us normatively. We learn from Wittgenstein that hinges affect our actions and language use. I will show that complementing the later Wittgenstein with Hegel's understanding of discursive activity elucidates the constitutive role that actions (including discursive activity) have as regards hinges, that is, the second feature of my account of hinges.

NICOLAS CUEVAS
(University of Bayreuth, Germany)
nicolas.cuevas-alvear@uni-bayreuth.de

Truth-Conditions as Conditions of Correct Application: Semantic Normativity and Pragmatic Guidelines

There is a close relationship between norms and language. The ongoing discussion revolves around how normativity can explain meaning, and if it can, which type of normativity would be appropriate. At the heart of this dialogue are Wittgenstein's reflections on the rule-paradox (PI, §201). The problem suggests that no fact, rule, or interpretation can definitively fix the conditions of correctness that govern the application or meaning of a linguistic expression, making it impossible to construct a comprehensive theory of meaning and utterances. This issue arises from the claim that the elements intended to fix meaning must function independently of how speakers interact with them, as if they could autonomously impose meaning on utterances. The rule-paradox underline that the conditions of correctness for the use of a linguistic expression cannot be determined solely by the connections between linguistic expressions and extralinguistic reality; speakers must also play a role in establishing these conditions. We propose reading Davidson's theory of truth as a theory of meaning through the lens of Hegel's idea that the true infinite is a series determined by a law of arrangement, because it highlights the functional structure of the theory. By interpreting Davidson's theory this way and following Myers and Verheggen's (2016) distinction between engendered normativity and semantic attitudinal normativity, we argue that Davidson's theory explains how meaning is fixed as truth-conditions using convention T in a linguistic triangular situation. Our main thesis is that the truth-conditions, state the conditions of correct application of a linguistic expression, and, in a pragmatic sense, they are guidelines for each specific linguistic situation on how we should engage with reality and its aspects: objects, subjects, and relations. In other words, understanding the meaning of an utterance involves understanding what actions should be taken in a linguistic situation to correctly apply a concept.

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RAMESH DHEERAVATH
(University of Hyderabad, India)
dheeravath18@gmail.com

Methodological Differences in Hegel's Dialectics and Wittgenstein's Language Games: Implications for Normativity and Rationality

This research paper examines the methodological differences between Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's dialectical approach and Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of language games. Both philosophers have significantly contributed to understanding normativity and rationality, but their approaches differ fundamentally. As outlined in his *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Hegel's dialectics involves a tripartite process of understanding, dialectical negation, and speculative unity. This method is driven by the necessity of self-sublation, where earlier determinations sublate themselves into their opposites, leading to a higher level of understanding. In contrast, Wittgenstein's language games, as described in his *Philosophical Investigations*, focus on the context-dependent use of language and the rules that govern its application. Wittgenstein's method emphasizes the importance of understanding language as a tool for describing the world, rather than as a means of accessing abstract truths.

This paper also aims to analyze the methodological differences between Hegel's dialectics and Wittgenstein's language games and their implications for understanding normativity and rationality. Hegel's dialectical approach is often seen as a means of achieving a higher level of understanding by overcoming the limitations of earlier determinations. In contrast, Wittgenstein's language games emphasize the importance of understanding language as a tool for describing the world, rather than as a means of accessing abstract truths. Along with that, this paper will also explore how these methods contribute to their respective understandings of normativity and rationality. Hegel's dialectics are often seen as a means of achieving a higher level of knowledge by overcoming the limitations of earlier determinations. In contrast, Wittgenstein's language games emphasize the importance of understanding language as a tool for describing the world, rather than as a means of accessing abstract truths.

MARTIN HERGOUTH
(University of Ljubljana, Slovenia)
hergouth.martin@gmail.com

Failure of Immediacy, Necessity of Immediacy and the Function of Writing

Two points of contact between Hegel's and Wittgenstein's (late) philosophy appear to be particularly well established. One is the parallel between Hegel's chapter on "Sense certainty" in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and Wittgenstein's argument about insufficiency of ostensive definitions; notably, both have inspired Sellars' "Myth of the Given" and inferentialist theory of concepts. The other parallel lines of thought are slightly more complex: Wittgenstein's argument against private language, the game-like character of language and apparently paradoxical character of rule-following has a parallel in Hegel's critique of Kantian practical self-legislation ("paradox of autonomy", after Pinkard) and his conceptual remedy of "Sittlichkeit". The interesting feature of this double pair is that both pairs of arguments exhibit similar symmetric opposition. Critique of sense certainty and critique of ostensive definitions are both criticisms of immediacy and arguments for the inevitability of meditation. Curiously, the other two set of arguments in contrast both include a point about "necessity of immediacy", that is, the need for actor's "immediate" relation to rules/practical laws in other to stave off the threat of infinite regress of justification. These multiple structural parallels can give us some confidence that we are here in fact dealing with a one and the same line of thought, which I will attempt to reconstruct. I will approach this task with the specific focus on the motive of writing, which appears on multiple neuralgic points of arguments in question (discussion of sense-certainty, opposition of written and unwritten laws in the Spirit chapter, Wittgenstein's diarist in §258 of the *Philosophical Investigations*).

NIKOLA JANDRIĆ
(University of Belgrade, Serbia)
nikolajandriczz@gmail.com

Expressive Rationality in Later Wittgenstein:
A Novel, Socratic Reading of the Rule-following Considerations

In my talk I will argue in favour of a novel interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations by making its consequences explicit. The main claim will be that such a reading offers a way of understanding Wittgenstein more thoroughly than any other currently on offer. The said way of understanding Wittgenstein is the one that labels him an expressivist – the characterisation which will be attempted to be proven to fit surprisingly well with the author's opus.

The thesis of expressivism is here to be understood as claiming that explaining a particular form of rationality – Socratic or expressive rationality – is the central task of philosophy (Brandom 2000). The expressivist interpretation of later Wittgenstein's rule following considerations will be shown to provide us with tools to elucidate all of the most plausible parts of the strongest disparate contemporary interpretations of the said primary text: the newest, and it seems currently most fashionable, resolute reading and the realism/antirealism debate stemming from Kripke's famous Kripkenstein reading. The expressivist reading will, thus, offer us a way of explaining the therapeutic aspect of Wittgeinstein, and, in that way, allow us to maintain the claims of continuity between earlier and later Wittgeinstein, while also allowing us to explain what was so wrong with the project of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

In the talk, I will approach the debate from the side of Kripke's Kripkenstein – mainly, because I believe that it provides the correct view of the problem that Wittgenstein presents us with – and from there, move on to discuss the so-called resolute reading.

DAVOR LAUC
(University of Zagreb, Croatia)
davor@lauc.org

Identity, Similarity, and Contextuality
in Hegel's *Logic* and Wittgenstein's *Investigations*

This research examines how Hegel and Wittgenstein approach the concepts of identity and similarity, noting that both philosophers recognize the importance of context in understanding these concepts despite their differing views and methods. Hegel's philosophy, particularly in *The Science of Logic*, emphasizes that similarity (*die Gleichheit*) and difference (*der Unterschied*) are contextually dependent and interrelated. He argues that comparing objects to identify similarities and differences relies on both identity and difference. Hegel suggests that empirical inquiries often focus on either reducing differences to identity or uncovering new differences, both of which depend on the context of the investigation. Therefore, similarity is always understood in relation to the specific framework and purpose of comparison, making it inherently contextual in Hegel's view.

In contrast, Wittgenstein, in his *Philosophical Investigations*, introduces the idea that meaning arises from the use of words within specific language games and forms of life, aligning with the notion that similarity is contextual. Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances in §66 suggests that similarities do not stem from a common essence but from overlapping features, akin to Hegel's view that identity and difference are contextual and relational. Wittgenstein emphasizes that understanding a word's meaning involves examining its use in a particular context, as stated in §43, where he defines meaning as the use of a word in language.

Both philosophers underscore the idea that similarity and identity are not static but are influenced by the context in which they are considered. This shared perspective highlights an evolving understanding of concepts as dependent on usage and context. Although not explicitly stated in their works, it suggests an agreement that similarity is primary to identity both epistemologically and ontologically. The research also explores the implications of this thesis for philosophical problems, including those related to the development of AI.

DAVID LINDEMAN
(Georgetown University, USA)
david.lindeman@georgetown.edu

Hegel, Heidegger, Wittgenstein – Identity and Difference: A Note on the Culmination

Pippin's Hegel in his *Hegel's Realm of Shadows* (2019) is the resolute Wittgenstein of Conant (1989) and Diamond (1988). Provided this identification, Pippin's Heidegger in *The Culmination* (2024) takes aim at the resolute Wittgenstein as much as at Hegel. But in this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is not to be read resolutely. In fact, I argue – in an elaboration of a view alternative to both the resolute and orthodox readings – that Wittgenstein and Heidegger, owing to their shared view of the nature of propositions, should be read as encountering the same problem in the course of carrying out the same project of making sense of making sense – the paradox of Being, as it is called in recent Heidegger scholarship – and offering the same solution: an abandonment of picture-thinking in Wittgenstein's sense and a turn to thinking in the sense of Heidegger: poeticizing. Wittgenstein's elucidations, so the thoughts they express, are indeed Heidegger's 'thoughts' had in carrying out 'the task of thinking', again likened by him to poeticizing – a task which is to follow the end of metaphysics, this having been brought to completion, according to both Heidegger and Wittgenstein, in science. Indeed, both seek a 'deeper', more truly 'philosophical' logic in the sense of the study of logos and require a non-propositional form of understanding and accordingly a conception of truth more fundamental than that which attaches to propositions – to wit, truth as *aletheia* as Heidegger understands this: truth as unconcealment, disclosure, revelation. Now, is Heidegger Pippin's Heidegger? I will help make the case for this identification. But was Heidegger's Hegel Hegel? I have identified Wittgenstein's elucidations and Heidegger's thoughts, both of which require us to 'transcend' the understanding in Hegel's sense. They might therefore seem to be the business of reason. And indeed, there is a case to be made that Hegel's speculative propositions play much the same role. With regard to this last question, then, I hope to show that the answer is by no means straightforward.

QINYI LUO
(University of California, Riverside, USA)
qinyi.luo@email.ucr.edu

Finding Justifications in Practices:
Hegel and Wittgenstein on Normativity

In this paper, I argue that both Hegel and Wittgenstein claim that justifications for our social practices can only be found within those very practices themselves. For Hegel, this is summed up in what is called the *Doppelsatz* ("What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational"). For Wittgenstein, this is reflected in how he thinks that we come to understand the criteria for using a word by investigating the grammatical uses of the word. But such a claim is puzzling: if what we aim for is the justification for a certain practice, how can that justification come from the very practice itself? Through an examination of the method deployed in the *Philosophy of Right* and the *Philosophical Investigations* – the two works that demonstrate how justifications are developed from the very practices that are to be justified – I show that what serves as the common ground between Hegel and Wittgenstein is that they both take normativity to be embedded within a shared way of life, a view that I argue is the only defensible view regarding the source of normativity. Finally, I address a worry that is often raised against the two philosophers: that their philosophical views about normativity are conservative. While both indeed make remarks about how the task of philosophy is merely to understand existing practices and not to instruct what these practices ought to be, I argue, contra the common view, that it is precisely what they take to be the limit of philosophy that leaves room for public revisions of social norms, and we find intellectual resources in both Hegel and Wittgenstein to account for possible revisions.

LUCA MORELLI FONSECA
(Boston College, USA)
morellif@bc.edu

Wittgenstein's Language Games:
An Investigation of the Non-Representational Capacity of Language

In this essay, I focus on drawing out Wittgenstein's epistemological and linguistical insights regarding normativity and language. I do this by focusing specifically on Wittgenstein's comments regarding the picture-model as well as a subtle rejection of representation-theory in language. I argue that this method of philosophical inquiry and writing is expressive of the epistemological insecurity of a post-Nietzschean cynicism in relation to the project of metaphysics.

To do so, I divide the essay in three parts: the first deals with Wittgenstein's opening of the *Philosophical Investigations* that takes up the Augustine picture of language. The second deals with trying to grasp what does it mean to take up a picture, or to understand language as a relationship between models. The third then puts the *Philosophical Investigations* alongside the *Tractatus* as well as certain passages of the *Gay Science*; in observing the work in dialogue with itself and the philosophical canon, we are then able to see how Wittgenstein reduces the notion of a stable, metaphysical, representational language to the absurd, or to madness.

In the conclusion, I gesture to how the paper is not attempting to reduce all language or philosophy to the absurd, nor is Wittgenstein arguing for something similar. However, the recognition of language as unstable is an aesthetic expression of the human incapacity to know in absolute. Thus, the *Tractatus*-Russell method of article writing, that is attempting to be clear and objective already pre-supposes an epistemological theory that cannot support itself.

DOMINIK MÜLLER
(ETH Zürich, Switzerland)
dominik.mueller@gess.ethz.ch

Wittgenstein, Science, and the Law of Causality

Wittgenstein does not regard the so-called *law of causality* (the law that every effect has a cause) as an actual law of nature but rather calls it the form of a law (TLP, 6.32). He places the law of causality closer to logical tautologies; the law of causality is an a priori insight into the possible structuring of the sentences of science (TLP, 6.34). TLP 6.36 asserts that the law of causality could be stated as: "There are laws of nature". This suggests the hypothesis that (as Eisenthal claims) the form of causality is in a way more fundamental than other forms.

According to Eisenthal, the form of causality is more fundamental in the sense that it corresponds to the description of facts based on temporal and spatial aspects and, in this sense, underlies all science. In a lecture preserved through notes from 1932, Wittgenstein also addresses the norm that every event has a cause but adopts a decidedly relativistic position. He claims that a mechanics could be created that does without the principle of causality. One might now assert that Wittgenstein's position has shifted towards relativism. I aim to show that Wittgenstein's remarks from this lecture can also be read as an extension of his thoughts in the *Tractatus* and that the law of causality for Wittgenstein has always been nothing more than a contingent norm of expression.

But what does it mean to say that the form of causality (which can be understood as a description based on temporal and spatial aspects) is not necessary? And even if it lacks logical necessity, it seems to be a prerequisite for any serious science. However, Wittgenstein himself shows in the "Conversations on Freud" from 1942 that the norm of the law of causality hinders our understanding of psychology and demonstrates that a science without the form of causality is not only logically possible but also fruitful.

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SIMONE NOTA
(Trinity College Dublin, Ireland)
snota@tcd.ie

Wittgenstein the Naturalist?

In his 1983 *Woodbridge Lectures*, Peter Strawson distinguished between two main varieties of Philosophical Naturalism: Hard Naturalism, which is scientific and reductive, and Soft Naturalism, which is humanistic and non-reductive (Strawson 1985: Ch. 1). Strawson then presented his own version of Soft Naturalism, claiming it was inspired by Wittgenstein's later philosophy as presented in *On Certainty* (ibid.). In this paper, I examine the question: Was Wittgenstein a philosophical naturalist of any kind? My discussion is divided into four sections. In §1, I provide a general methodological definition of Philosophical Naturalism and its two main types: Scientific (hard) Naturalism and Humanistic (soft) Naturalism. In §2, I argue that Wittgenstein cannot be considered a scientific naturalist in philosophy, given his sharp distinction between the tasks of philosophy – resolving conceptual confusions – and those of science – ascertaining factual matters (e.g., TLP, 4.11s; cf. PI, §89). In §3, I contend, contrary to Strawson, that Wittgenstein cannot be classified as a humanistic naturalist in philosophy either. While Wittgenstein's later methods may be characterized as anthropological, they are not empirical and thus cannot be naturalistic (OC, §98; cf. PI, Part II, xii). The challenge is to understand how Wittgenstein can philosophically investigate beliefs and rules to which we, given our social nature, may be committed, without doing so naturalistically or *a posteriori*. In §4, I will address this question by leveraging the notion of the "relativized a priori": an a priori that is not absolutely independent of all experiences, as Kant's was supposed to be (Kant 1998, B2–3), but rather evolves dynamically with them, as a presupposition of their sense (cf. Reichenbach 1965, Ch. 5). I will thus conclude that Wittgenstein's later philosophy might still be characterized as transcendental, rather than naturalistic, though this is a "social transcendentalism".

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DAVID PALME
(Frankfurt, Germany)
davidpalme@posteo.de

Contradiction as a Form of Life:
20th Century Moral Philosophy through the Lens of Wittgenstein's Work

The dominant neo-Kantian philosophical discussion on morality shares certain assumptions, such as ethical pluralism, moral progress, and the distinction between modern and traditional morality. Philosophers distinguish modern morality through the concept of moral justification, i.e. a reflexive process of giving reasons that validate a rule. Consistency becomes the critical criterion for sound justification.

The paper questions this paradigm by "applying" a variation of the so-called Private Language Argument. It regards language as something essentially social and practical. Any judgment is itself part of our "form of life". Thus, it becomes problematic to use reflection on our form of judgment to justify or criticize moral rules in an absolute sense. Wittgenstein himself argued against consistency as some kind of meta-rule for rules (e.g. WWK 1979: 121–128).

My paper further explores the connection between Wittgenstein's 'paradox' of rule-following (PI: §201) and Hegel's criticism of Kant's categorical imperative as tautological (Hegel, 1986: 461). Both philosophers, in their own ways, problematize the relation of rules and practices. They challenge the idea of a pre-social, individual capacity of reason suitable to justify social practices. They also question the sufficiency of consistency as a criterion for sound justification. Instead, they propose a more nuanced view, where reason and action are dialectically intertwined. This perspective, I argue, offers a more comprehensive understanding of philosophical problems as mirrors of our form of life.

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MATE PENAVA
(University of Zadar, Croatia)
matepenava@gmail.com

Normativity of Forms of Life

The paper aims to explore one venue in which the notion of form of life can be construed as a normative concept. This notion has received a lot of scholarly attention though it is scarcely mentioned in Wittgenstein's writings. The starting point of this paper is that a form of life is constituted by agreed upon joint practices and institutions, i.e., that it is built up as different from it being inscribed into existing patterns of (non)linguistic behaviour. When a form of life is built up, it takes up a normative role, (not)performing certain actions is judged as acceptable or unacceptable from the status of such actions inside a certain form of life. A taxonomy of various ways in which a form of life can be exhibited is proposed and explored, with its implication on the notion of normativity.

GURPREET RATTAN
(University of Toronto, Canada)
gurpreet.rattan@utoronto.ca

Disagreement and Notational Advantage
in a Solipistic Language

Wittgenstein's remarks about a solipsistic language underpin a nuanced view of the epistemology of deep disagreement in which one's own opinion enjoys a notational but not substantive privilege. Wittgenstein considers the possibility of a solipsistic language that places oneself at its "centre" and in which self-ascriptions of psychological states proceed in an impersonal, Lichtenbergian, mode. For Wittgenstein, though privileged in some sense, one cannot say that the language that has oneself at its centre is privileged over other languages, because there is no language in which it can be said – not in the language which has oneself is at the centre, and not in a language in which another is at the centre. In the former, the saying is trivial, and in the latter, absurd. Instead, privilege in the language with oneself at its centre is expressed in "application" and is part of the solipsistic notation. Some theorists have suggested that in disagreement one's own opinion can be privileged over others. Wittgenstein's remarks suggest that this privilege cannot be said, but if present, should be present in the notation of disagreement. Specifically, this privilege cannot be cited as a reason to favour one's own opinion in disagreement. If there is privilege for one's own opinion here, it is privilege based on notation and not some sort of fact that can be cited as a reason. The paper concludes by outlining a view on the epistemology of deep disagreement in which privilege for one's own opinion is part of the notation of disagreement. The notation concerns a distinction between the modes of presentation by way of which one's own and others thoughts are presented in the reflective and interpretive dimensions of deep disagreement. The difference in mode of presentation makes for privilege for without any reason for privileging one's own opinion.

FLORIAN RIEGER
(University of Basel, Switzerland)
florian.rieger@unibas.ch

The Idea of Practice in Wittgenstein

In the course of his rule-following considerations, Wittgenstein reminds us, among other things, of the fact that following a rule is a practice (PI §202), that it is a custom, i.e. something no one can do only once (PI §199); and that it is bound up with the mastery of a technique (PI §199 & §150). Many commentators have read these remarks as suggesting a community agreement view, according to which there can be no rule-following without a community of several rule followers. One version of this community view is defended by Meredith Williams (see Williams 1991, 1994, 2011; different versions of the community view are defended e.g. by Malcolm 1989 and Bloor 1997). She insists that those who have mastered the pertinent techniques are the main authority in questions about how to follow a rule. At the bedrock level, however, the judgments of these masters amount to, at best, the expression of a mere opinion. For the masters of this communal practice can only say what seems right to them, while it still remains to be seen whether this is in line with the judgments of their peers (cf. Williams 1994: 193). Thus, on this account, the masters of a practice appear to be rather lonesome figures; they cannot speak authoritatively for their community of rule-followers. And so the community view seems, in the end, unable to account for the "we" that characterizes the acts of a communal practice. In my presentation, I will argue that this view fails to grasp central elements of Wittgenstein's thoughts about rule-following. I will do so by presenting a rough sketch of an account of what Wittgenstein might mean by a practice of rule-following, drawing on some Aristotelian ideas concerning the concept of a technique and its acquisition.

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LUCAS SANZEY
(University of Lorraine, France)
lucas.sanzey@univ-lorraine.fr

On Reception and Use of Wittgenstein
in Philosophy of Law

During the 1980s and 1990s, the question of rules became central firstly with Saul Kripke in order to address the problem of alleged scepticism in Wittgenstein's work. However, far from being confined to Wittgensteinian studies it also became a central point within the theory of law: some scholars then became not only interested in Wittgenstein, but above all in Kripke's interpretation of his texts. Such philosophers (close to Legal realism or Critical Legal Studies) argue that the law is inherently indeterminate, meaning that the legal rules that make up the body of law (i.e. laws, statutes, contracts, etc.) do not themselves possess a meaning that would make it possible to confidently justify their application in any context. Rather, there would exist a vagueness as to what constitutes a correct (or incorrect) application of a given text. For the correct or incorrect application of the rule to be recognised the rule should already be sufficiently well circumscribed, which they say it is not: "But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule" (Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd edition, New York: Macmillan, 1958).

This vagueness if well-founded could be both beneficial and harmful. Beneficial because it opens the possibility of a continuous evolution of law parallel to the political evolution of societies, e.g. the accession to legal personality of non-human animals. Harmful, however, because that if there were no criterion for rightly saying that an application of a rule (or a judicial decision) actually corresponds to the real meaning of a rule, then the rule of law as such would be threatened. If a decision cannot be rightly justified because of the inherent indetermination of the law, then what is to prevent judges from "applying" it arbitrarily? Why would judges' decisions be utterly different from the mere expression of the ideological, economic or political arbitrariness of an influential part of society over the rest?

Hence, for the rule of law to be saved – that is, for our interpretation of what law is to be in accord with its actual practice – we need an interpretation of Wittgenstein on rule-following that makes sense of it. That is, one that reflects both the open texture of the law and our real agreement within it.

VIRGINIA SORO
(University of Lausanne, Switzerland)
virginia.soro@unil.ch

Intellect in Action:
McDowell reading Hegel after Wittgenstein

John McDowell is one of the three representatives of the American pragmatist Pittsburgh school and, together with Robert Brandom, the most important scholar of Wilfrid Sellars. His work, largely inspired by Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty (e.g. 2009b IV: 12), bears upon the normativity of reason, primarily conceived through immediate sensory experience.

The problem for pragmatism is to provide a standard for evaluating intersubjective discourses without resorting to supernatural elements such as sensory contents or universals (Sellars 1963). The 'given' can take different forms, having all in common their mythical, i.e. conceptually unmediated, character. The stake for McDowell's common-sense realism lies in providing an account of the world's claims on understanding, namely of objectivity, without relying on such givenness. His defense of embodied rationality purports to answer the question by drawing from Wittgenstein (1994). But it is only after being acquainted with Hegel's work that he develops an account of how conceptuality itself is embedded in the world, thereby radicalizing Kant's account of objective knowledge (2009a II: 4).

Pace Brandom (2009a III: 8; 2009b II: 6), he reconciles Hegel's conceptual realism with Wittgenstein's empirical stand. By interpreting Hegel as addressing the same issues that concerned Wittgenstein, McDowell sets up an insightful new road to pragmatism. His claim that the intellect, i.e. conceptuality itself, comes to have knowledge through its agency in the world aims at reacting to both theological and relativist epistemological threats. My aim will be to show that his account of the world's authority over human understanding not only avoids the myth of the given, but gives further prominence to the normative scope of perception. The talk will explore how his conception of experience is informed by Hegel, whose perspective will be enriched by McDowell's takeaway on the Wittgensteinian linguistic turn.

MATIJA VIGATO
(University of Zagreb, Croatia)
matijavigato@gmail.com

Hegel's and Wittgenstein's Influence on Sellars' Critique of the Myth of the Given

Wilfrid Sellars' critique of the myth of the given challenges the thesis that knowledge can rest on immediate, non-conceptual sensory data, and it can be seen as reflecting the influences of both G. W. F. Hegel and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Hegel's dialectical method and emphasis on the conceptual mediation of experience, along with Wittgenstein's focus on the public nature of language and meaning, provide a contextual backdrop for Sellars' arguments. This framework entails a rejection of foundationalism and the atomistic view of knowledge, emphasising the interconnectedness of concepts within their socio-historical contexts, as well as the normative dimensions of knowledge and the essential role of community in meaning-making. The aim of this paper is to illuminate the key influences of Hegel and Wittgenstein on Sellars, and to critically evaluate the interpretations of these influences by John McDowell and Robert Pippin.

KWING-YUI WONG
(Soochow University, Taiwan)
kwingyui@gmail.com

Unraveling the Connections:
Wittgenstein's and Hegel's Perspectives on Rule-Following

This paper explores the surprising similarities and connections between Wittgenstein's conception of rule-following and Hegel's views on the same topic, as explored in the first four chapters of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The paper begins with Wittgenstein's remarks from his *Philosophical Investigations*, sections 138–242, which contain two central claims regarding understanding: the negative claim that understanding is not a mental state or process, and the positive claim that understanding is an ability to do certain things. Wittgenstein explores these ideas through a discussion of rule-following. Instead of contrasting Wittgenstein's views with Hegel's, this paper seeks to uncover the underlying affinities between their perspectives on the nature of rule-following.

The body of the paper begins by examining Hegel's arguments on rule-following, which draw heavily on Kant's Transcendental Deduction. Both Kant and Hegel recognized that for an agent to follow a conceptual rule, two necessary conditions must be met: the agent must have the intention to follow the rule, and the agent must recognize the rule-following process. Hegel's contribution was to further explicate the nature of this rule-following, which aligns with Wittgenstein's emphasis on the practical, contextual dimensions of language use.

This paper contends that it is the sociality of rule-following as a key common aspect in Hegel's and Wittgenstein's perspectives. Wittgenstein's view that rule-following is grounded in the regular, customary actions from the community, rather than in our personal mental states or processes, echoing Hegel argued that for someone to follow a conceptual rule, the community must supply the criteria for the correctness of the application.

KONRAD WYSZKOWSKI
(University of Warsaw, Poland)
k.wyszkowski@uw.edu.pl

Knowledge of Truth and Cognition of Verisimilitude: Hegel and the Problem of the Ground for Cognitive Norms

Hegel's concept of truth is, i.a., a successful rebuttal of a view, which can be attributed to Fichte, that we strive to be closer and closer to the truth, because it is our normative obligation. The supposition lying in this view is that we cannot achieve the truth. But if we do not close the striving, Hegel argues, we will not be able to know what is true and what is false. So, we must have the ability to know the truth, and to know it presently. The concept of Fichte, and (in other versions) of James, Rickert or Popper, of indefinite striving for truth cannot be true.

I want to save both of those important insights, by using and refreshing two epistemological concepts introduced by Bronisław Trentowski, a post-Hegelian philosopher. In his *Logic* (*Myślini*; 1844), approving the German-idealist concept of the unity of God's and human's mind, he nevertheless differentiates the God's knowledge of truth (*prawda*) and ours of the verisimilitude (*prawdopodobieństwo*). The verisimilitude is similar (*similis*) to the truth (*veritas*), but is not the truth itself. I want to argue that Trentowski's concepts, after necessary renovation, can be used to solve the problem of uniting both of those true accounts: potentially constant process of acquiring the truth and the need for the knowledge of the truth itself.

I want to show that the human cognitive functions and cognitive projects should not be interpreted as a closed set, but as in part known and actual, but in part unknown and potential, enlarging organism or ecosystem, which develops with our cognitive actions. But the development cannot be measured by itself. Hence the last, essential step: there is something epistemologically external to the growing complex of cognizing and cognized beings. A hidden reality, the truth itself, which we do not know, but about which we know that it must exist to adequately explain our overt life.